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**Present:**

**Co-chairs:** Auke Lootsma (UNDP); Giorgi Gigauri (IOM)

**Participants:** William Chemaly (UN Special Advisor Office on Solutions for IDPs), Lisa Monaghan (IOM), Rima Ali (OCHA); Monique Maani (OCHA); Caroline Henderson (IOM); Cristina Portales (IOM); Clementine Favrier (IOM); Sheema Sen Gupta (UNICEF), Wa'el Al Asshab (UN Habitat), Muslim Quazimi (UN-Habitat); Santhy Iyyakkunnel (SDC); Adesoji Adeniyi (FCDO/UK); Jason Meisner (USAID); Arefu Araki (UNHCR); Najat Al-Dawody (NCCI); Christophe Reltien (ECHO); Barbara Egger (EC); Asaad Ibrahim (Special Advisor to RC)

**Secretariat:** Rene Dierkx (UNDP); Dennis Schleppi (UNDP), Precillar Moyo (IOM), Mohamed Osman (IOM), Mohammed Chalabi (RCO); Mohammed Abdelrazzak (RCO)

**Opening and Agenda by Co-Chairs**

- The co-Chairs welcomed the members – DSRSG/RC/HC gave opening remarks - and shared Agenda
  - (i) DS Compact Iraq Update (Lisa Monaghan)
  - (ii) Presentation and discussion on DS Coordination Structure (RCO)
  - (iii) Brief on Jeddah 5 Camp Closure (IOM)
  - (iv) AOB

**DS Compact Iraq Update**

- **Lisa Monaghan** provided an update on the DS Compact Iraq:

- Update:

- 5 March Compact Concept Note was developed + circulated with DSTF on 21 March
- William Chemaly + Lisa Monaghan mission to Iraq 1- 14 April – preparatory phase
- Engagement with Federal Iraq and KRG – included PM Office, MoDM and MoI KRG
- Technical review of specifics of Compact commitment areas [tasks + feasibility + timeline]
- Data collection exercise has started- REACH/IOM-DTM
- Consultations included: DSTF, DSTWG, Protection Platform + other stakeholders

- Next Steps

- DSRSG + DS Co-chairs to review a summary of commitments, prioritization, and commitment sequencing (Nb. commitments are ongoing i.e., residual hum., DSTF/policy work with Gov);
- Formalize engagement with the Government
- William Chemaly + Lisa Monaghan to return to Iraq between 21 – 31 May
- DTM/REACH to complete the initial data analysis exercise
- Support requested from DSTF members on political and analytical engagement

- **William Chemaly**, in addition, shared points on the political engagement component:

- Prepare a background doc. on the areas that need to be negotiated and agreed upon with the Gov
- Compact presents a phased approach with achievable goals and aim at more complex goals
- Various issues. *Technical*, aim at admin delays, standards; *financial*, relating to services & reconstruction costs; *Political* around Yazidi/other groups: need careful negotiation
- Furthermore, the level of consultation (with Gov), holds a promise to move forward with confidence in negotiating with the Gov re the commitments in the Compact

**Discussion:**

**DSRSG/RC/HC:** we have undertaken a methodological approach to what is in essence of high political complexity. Re political engagement it is useful **i)** to have something tangible in hand for Gov re our

intention and what direction we are moving, present the building blocks and engage the Gov; **ii**) It is useful to have a timeline for the launch, and **iii**) discuss (possibly in a smaller group), the funding component.

**DSTF co-Chair, IOM:** Re the funding issue, the aim is to handover to Gov but, in the interim, there is a lot of coordination and info-management that will continue to be required hence this needs to be reinforced to the donors. Particularly coordination requires investments i.e. in focal points working at Governorate and ABC level, in Analysis and Evaluation, Information Management and Reporting

**UN-Habitat:** It would be important to know where the funding from Gov-side once committed would flow to continue the work on durable solutions in the targeted Governorates

**Lisa Monaghan** In terms of the political engagement timeline, the document would be available by the end of May for further engagement with the Gov. and a 2-pager summary could be available in one week.

**DSRSG/RC/HC:** It would be of the essence to look at the Governance structure for the Compact since many issues will not automatically fall into place hence a need to engage with Gov – both formal and informal and can discuss this with the DSTF co-chairs once the document is more advanced.

**DSTF co-Chair, UNDP:** It would be of essence to translate the document into Arabic in order to yield the result, we wish for and for the Gov to digest and reflect

**DSTWG co-Chair, IOM:** re budget allocations, it would be strategic to share the main themes or workstream as swiftly as possible with the Gov so that it can allocate some budget to it before allocation to other work would consume the funds

**UNOCHA, Rima Ali:** Apart from Arab translation, a translation in Kurdish would also be needed.

**William Chemaly:** It would be important to imagine how the end-term would look like and then we build up a backward timeline to the process in steps. Hence it is all clear

### **Presentation and Discussion on DS Coordination Structure (RCO)**

➤ **Coordination Officer, RCO** presented on the Joint Coordination Forum:

➤ Background:

- In 2014, OCHA established General Coordination Meeting (GCM) in 5 +3 governorates in KRI.
- In Dec. 2022, the humanitarian cluster system was deactivated
- In time, OCHA launched Humanitarian Transition Overview (HTO).

**In response,**

- ✓ GCMs will be transitioned into the Joint Coordination Forum (JCF), initially in ABC functioning governorate.

➤ Overview (visual):

- GCM operational at the Governorate level in: Baghdad, Erbil, Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah-al-Din, and Ninewa.
- ABC operational at the Governorate level in: Salah-al-Din, Kirkuk, Diyala, and at District level in: East-Anbar, West-Anbar, Ba'aj, Sinjar and Mosul

➤ Rationale and Purpose:

- Maintain the governorate-level coordination mechanism.
- Bring together humanitarian-stabilization-development-peacebuilding & Governorate auth.
- Coordinate efforts of Governorate authorities along with UN, INGOs, NNGOs, and CSOs.

➤ Streamlined Governorate-level Coordination:

- JCF is responsible for various tasks at the Governorate level, Humanitarian, Stabilization, Development and Peacebuilding including facilitating the implementation of DS compact
- Overlaps with established ABC groups respective activities (DS).

**In response to redundancy**

- ABCs gradually phase out activities for up to 6 months or until they become impractical.
- ABCs will continue to hold coordination meetings at the district level
- ABCs provide technical support to the JCF.



- Joint Coordination Forum (JCF) Activities:
  - Resolve implementation issues related to the DS Compact.
  - Address operational and access challenges.
  - Share information on humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities.
  - Provide early warning of emerging disasters.
  - Strengthen partnerships between Governorate authorities and aid workers at the Governorate-level to enhance collaboration and coordination.
- Chair and Secretariat:
  - The JCF will be jointly chaired by two individuals.
    - The first chair will be filled by the governor or their representative
    - The second chair will be filled by the most senior staff (UN or NGO) as per set criteria and entities' expression of interest.
  - The DSO will provide secretariat support.
- JCF Membership
  - The membership is open to UN, INGOs, LNGOs, and CSOs that are involved and active in the relevant sectors.
  - Heads of relevant Governorate Directorates (as agreed by the Governor).
    - Members are expected to be at a decision-making level for both sides.
  - ABC chairs are also standing members of the JCFs throughout the transitional period.
- Reporting Lines (visual):
  - (Please, view discussion, further below)

**Discussion:**

**DSRSG/RC/HC:** JCF with Gov-partners cannot be held accountable to DSTWG/DSTF unless these are also Gov-led. Hence, the JCF is more accountable to the Supreme Committee

**Coordination Officer, RCO:** Dotted lines are for info-sharing and sharing minutes of meetings

**DSRSG/RC/HC:** Reporting lines still need to be looked into more in detail and simplified how the JCF is going to relate to the larger structure. The JCF's focus will be more on DS and Dev. Coordination matters Hence, we would need to keep it light practical and, action-oriented focusing on issues resolution, and filling the vacuum left by cluster deactivation. The leadership quality both from Gov- and non-Gov will be critical. Also, re area-based coordination (ABCs), in transitioning from hum. to DS, we also need to transition our coordination structure hence, none should remain permanent and transformed if needed.

**DSTF co-Chair, UNDP:** A lot of hard work has gone into preparing these terms of reference. As some pertinent comments were made re the reporting lines, nothing stays in the way of endorsing these TORs and if no further comments, not objections, I consider this as an endorsement of the TORs subject to the required changes and then circulate it among the DSTF members for final comments and take it forward.

**DSTWG co-Chair, IOM:** The ABCs worked on POA revision hence, a practical question: do we inform ABCs to scrap the POAs? The ABCs were a tool for planning and coordination with authorities and activities, and a compilation of existing plans by partners, local authorities, and community consultation

**DSRSG/RC/HCs** We want to move away from such a body to become a monitoring & planning body as that should be done by the Gov. bottom-up would be about how to plan, cost and solve, hence tackling an issue bottom-up but this requires a mandate, but ABCs were not created for this purpose

**DSTWG co-Chair IOM:** this was precisely their mandate, but the issue was that the ABCs were not funded, and this issue may need to be looked into re the JCF or else it may experience the same challenges.

**DSRSG/RC/HC** When we look into phasing-out the ABCs, they should not start looking into new planning **Coordination Officer, RCO:** The ABCs are currently finalizing their revisions of the Plans of Action and following these POAs can be handed over to the JCF and Government so it could be seen as a reference

**DSRSG/RC/HC:** I sense we are, again, creating a parallel mechanism but our focus instead should be for Gov to take ownership and leadership and help them so, I would like to move to DS type activities where we resolve bottlenecks, avoid overlaps, info-sharing, identify problems, and focus on solutions as a basis of the Compact. The ABC work is a huge workload, and this should not move to the JCF

**Program Specialist UNDP:** POAs are useful, providing useful data at least for the districts and this data could be adopted by the JCF and serve as a baseline and knowledge transfer from the ABCs to the JCF

**DSTF co-Chair UNDP:** To bring this discussion to closure – you all have answered some of the questions so it would be pending for you to re-draft the reporting lines schedule, then share it for final comments and then move forward on a non-objection basis

**DSTF co-Chair IOM:** That sounds fine and align it and also within the UN and NGO World clear reporting lines as well so that we avoid having detached units operating without transparency

### **Brief on Jeddah 5 Camp Closure (IOM)**

**Round 13:** of departure (17 Apr) facilitated by IOM through facilitated voluntary movement (FVM), in coordination with MoMD.

- **85** households: 64 (female-headed HHs) and 21 (male-headed HHs) with **368** individuals out of which 70 HHs returned to their Areas of Origin (74% Qayyara) and 15 HHs relocated to other areas (53% Qayyara and 40% Markaz Mosul).

**Reason:** Community rejection or tribal issues, housing damage and/or lack of livelihoods in AoO MOMD and NOC announced the same day (17 Apr) closure of the camp giving IDPs 2 days to leave.

**On 19 April 2023** Jeddah 5 camp was closed officially; **314** evicted households: **206** (female); **108** (male) and **495** evicted individuals:

- **273/314** evicted HHs registered with IOM FVM: **182** (female); **91** (male)
- **41/314** evicted households not registered with IOM FVM: **24** (female); **17** (male)
- **281/314** evicted households reached through arrival calls: **186** (female); **95** (male)

**Response:** Through the ABC Mosul, and Protection Platform, response capacity was mapped, and initial responses are ongoing as follows:

- Provision of support/services to HHs include: CCCM, INTERSOS, IOM, IRC, Mercy Hands, NP, NRC, PGDO, WRO, UNHCR, UNICEF (via its IP, TDH-Italy).
- Services incl. protection case management, monitoring, assessments, GBV support, emergency cash, cash for protection, grants for movement, and legal / doc. support. Also, UNICEF supports referrals between affected children and families and social protection schemes.
- Key gaps incl. physical safety of families returning to areas of origin (AoOs) where social tensions are high re perceived affiliation, advocacy around services, food security, evictions and humanitarian assistance for families afraid of/unable to return

### **Identified priorities for advocacy:**

#### National Authorities:

Adherence to principled returns which are dignified, voluntary and safe for camps and informal sites.

- Address obstacles to return which face especially those linked with social cohesion, and engage with communities before putting families at risk

- Recognise that closure of camps does not end the displacement file, finding solutions for families ends displacement, X% of those evicted are in secondary displacement and in worse conditions than they were in the camp.

Authorities in Ninewa:

- Should avoid any further forced displacement of the children and families that were evicted and work with receiving communities to enable them to settle in a sustainable manner
- Should return documentation that was confiscated and lift any movement restrictions.
- Must provide children and families that were displaced to Hawassim with a place to live and access to services.

**Authorities in the Governorates of origin of families that remain displaced in Hawassim**

should be alerted to provide the required mediation and support to enable the return of the families.

**Directorate of Education (DoE)** support is required to ensure children can register at schools in areas of relocation to complete exams and the school year, including possibly waiving documentation

**Discussion:**

**DSRSG/RC/HC:** we first were informed about an upcoming closure of J5 in Dec 2022, and we engaged the Min of MoMD and we agreed on an extension with a plan of action. By Mar 2023, another letter came from MoMD announcing the closure in 60 days and this was agreed however just before Eid we received another alert stating J5 was to be closed in 48 hours. Any discussion and objection from our side around the sudden closure of J5 with the Minister and the Prime Minister was not successful. A joint statement was issued from the RCO, and we registered our objection to the eviction and that these families are being looked after. It can be seen more as a political move. There is a humanitarian need here needed and a durable solution to be looked into thereafter. We will continue to raise this with the Government

**DSTF co-Chair IOM:** Thank you for all the response support and this will probably not be the last crisis we will have to deal with of this nature – hence we just have to be prepared

**A.O.B.**

No points under A.O.B.

**Summary of Action Points:**

**Action Point 1:** produce a 2-page summary of the Compact document with an indicative timeline for the launch/signing ceremony with the Gov and UN.

**Action Point 2:** produce a translation of the Compact document both into Arabic and Kurdish

**Action Point 3:** simplify reporting lines and make the higher strategic linkage(-s) between JCF and other joint Gov-UN bodies clearer Share with the DSTF members for final comment